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THE THICKNESS OF BLOOD: ARTICLE I, SECTION 7,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND COMMERCIAL DNA
DATABASES
Hannah Parman*
Abstract: Law enforcement agencies increasingly use online commercial and open source
DNA databases to identify suspects in cases that have long since gone cold. By uploading
crime scene DNA to one of these websites, investigators can find family members who have
used the website and build a family tree leading back to the owner of the original DNA. This
is called “familial DNA searching.” The highest profile use of this investigative method to date
occurred in California, but law enforcement in Washington State has been quick to begin
utilizing the method as well. However, article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution
provides an enhanced privacy right to Washington residents when compared to the United
States Constitution. This privacy right, which protects citizens’ private affairs from
governmental intrusion without a warrant, is likely violated by law enforcement use of these
databases in this manner. Washington courts should and will probably conclude that this
investigative technique seriously threatens this crucial constitutional right. However, the
Washington legislature should not wait for the courts to weigh in. Instead, lawmakers should
pass legislation to ensure that this violation of citizens’ privacy is prohibited.

INTRODUCTION
So you see there is little danger of my forgetting them, and far less blood
relations; for surely blood is thicker than water.
—John Moore1
Between 1974 and 1986, an unknown man committed at least fifty
rapes and twelve murders across multiple California counties.2 For
decades, the world would only know this man as the Golden State Killer.3
Then in 2016, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced a
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1. 2 JOHN MOORE, ZELUCO: VARIOUS VIEWS OF HUMAN NATURE, TAKEN FROM LIFE AND
MANNERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 217 (4th ed. 1797).
2. Aja Romano, DNA Profiles from Ancestry Websites Helped Identify the Golden State Killer
Suspect, VOX (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17290288/golden-statekiller-joseph-james-deangelo-dna-profile-match [https://perma.cc/SP79-ZFXX].
3. Id.
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renewed effort to solve what by that point was a very cold case.4 Two
years into this effort, police arrested a seventy-two-year-old former police
officer named Joseph James DeAngelo and charged him with twelve
counts of first-degree murder.5 DeAngelo had been tracked down using
familial DNA searching.6 Investigators had obtained his DNA from a
crime scene decades before, but it did not match any existing entry when
they entered the DNA into the FBI’s national DNA database.7 However,
with the recent increased popularity of commercial DNA databases like
23andMe and Ancestry.com, investigators no longer needed the Golden
State Killer to contribute a sample to any government DNA database.8
Instead, they simply checked crime scene DNA against GEDmatch, a free
genealogy website with an extensive genomics database.9 Although
DeAngelo’s DNA was not there, a distant relative’s was, allowing
investigators to narrow the suspect pool to a single family and eventually
to DeAngelo himself.10 Finally, nearly half a century after he committed
his crimes, DeAngelo pled guilty to the Golden State Killer murders and
kidnappings.11
Similar stories have played out in Washington State. In 1987, the body
of a young Canadian woman named Tanya Van Cuylenborg was
discovered in rural Skagit County.12 She had been raped, shot in the head,
and left in a ditch.13 Two days later, the body of the boyfriend with whom

4. Cold Case Killer: Help Us Catch the East Area Rapist, FBI: NEWS (June 15, 2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/help-us-catch-the-east-area-rapist [https://perma.cc/R8VCHVUB].
5. Cheri Mossburg & Darran Simon, Suspected Golden State Killer Now Charged in 12 Killings,
CNN (May 11, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/10/us/suspected-golden-state-killercharges/index.html [https://perma.cc/WD8D-FBSJ].
6. Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the ‘Golden State
Killer’ Suspect, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2018, 6:50 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/truecrime/wp/2018/04/27/golden-state-killer-dna-website-gedmatch-was-used-to-identify-josephdeangelo-as-suspect-police-say/ [https://perma.cc/C8F9-YLHR].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Eliot C. McLaughlin & Stella Chan, Hearing Details Ghastly Crimes of Golden State Killer as
He Pleads Guilty to Killings, CNN (June 29, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/
29/us/golden-state-killer-plea-expected/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z8WK-7EDN]. DeAngelo was
not charged with the rapes due to the statute of limitations. Id.
12. Sara Jane Green, Investigators Use DNA, Genealogy Database to ID Suspect in 1987 Double
Homicide, SEATTLE TIMES (May 18, 2018, 12:58 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/crime/investigators-use-dna-genealogy-database-to-id-suspect-in-1987-double-homicide/
[https://perma.cc/72Q6-MU7K].
13. Id.
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she had been traveling, Jay Cook, was found under a bridge.14 In 2018,
Washington law enforcement arrested William Earl Talbott II after
identifying his second cousins through GEDmatch and building a family
tree from that information.15 Law enforcement said that Talbott had never
been on any list of suspects, and no tip about him had ever been
provided.16 Like DeAngelo, Talbott had not uploaded his DNA to a
genealogy site.17
Use of public DNA databases in this manner by law enforcement in
Washington seems to be picking up steam. Less than a month after
Talbott’s arrest, another man was arrested for the 1986 rape and murder
of twelve-year-old Michella Welch in Tacoma following a search of
commercial DNA databases.18 More recently, in July 2020, the
Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office arrested a sixty-two-year-old Bothell
man named Alan Edward Dean for the 1993 murder of fifteen-year-old
Melissa Lee.19 The sheriff’s press release stated that Dean’s arrest was the
county’s third involving assistance from Parabon NanoLabs, a DNA
technology company.20 Parabon used crime scene DNA to find Dean’s
relatives on a public genetic genealogy website, at which point detectives
acquired Dean’s DNA from an abandoned cigarette butt in order to
confirm his identity as Lee’s killer.21
This increasingly popular investigatory method, often called “familial
DNA searching”22 or “investigative genetic genealogy,”23 has raised both
privacy and due process concerns,24 as well as other social and ethical

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Selk, supra note 6; Green, supra note 12.
18. Joshua Bessex, DNA in a Genealogy Database and a Used Napkin Link Suspect to Michella
Welch Murder, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (June 22, 2018, 12:22 PM), https://www.thenews
tribune.com/news/local/crime/article213651959.html [https://perma.cc/YY79-TP6D].
19. Press Release, Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., Suspect Arrested in 1993 Homicide Cold Case
(July 29, 2020) [hereinafter Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. Press Release], https://Snohomish
countywa.gov/Archive.aspx?ADID=6505 [https://perma.cc/DG93-DAZ9].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. SARA DEBUS-SHERRILL & MICHAEL B. FIELD, UNDERSTANDING FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING:
POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND POTENTIAL IMPACT 2 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/251043.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET5Y-XUGW].
23. Natalie Ram, Investigative Genetic Genealogy and the Future of Genetic Privacy, 16 SCITECH
LAW. 18, 19 (2020).
24. Sarah Kellogg, To Catch a Criminal: Ethics and Privacy in DNA Familial Searches, 33 WASH.
LAW. 29, 30–31 (2018).
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issues.25 As a University of Washington ethicist asked when being
interviewed about the Golden State Killer case, “[DeAngelo] was a
horrible man and it is good that he was identified, but does the end justify
the means?”26 As of 2018, Ancestry.com and 23andMe—two of the more
popular commercial DNA databases—had the DNA of ten million and
five million customers, respectively, in their systems.27 Although The New
York Times said in 2018 that “[i]t is unlikely that the apparent success of
the method in the Golden State Killer case will spur a rush to use
genealogy databases to solve crimes,”28 it appears that rush has arrived.
One news article from February 2020 describes the “dozens of cold cases”
solved in this manner in the previous two years and goes on to list nine of
those cases which were “very, very old.”29 But the DNA hosted on these
sites does not only belong to the individuals who have made the choice to
upload it—their non-consenting siblings, parents, children, and cousins
share some of that DNA as well.30
This investigative technique raises particular concern when used by law
enforcement in Washington. It is “well settled that article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution provides greater protection to individual
privacy rights than the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”31 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, the privacy rights
protected by the Washington Constitution “[are] not confined to the
subjective privacy expectations of modern citizens who, due to well
publicized advances in surveillance technology, are learning to expect
diminished privacy in many aspects of their lives.”32 Although it is well
established that the collection of DNA is a search under the Washington
Constitution,33 Washington courts have yet to address whether the use of
25. See generally Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in
Forensic Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
263 (2006).
26. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a Thicket of
DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/
27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/2U4V-C533].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Robert Gearty, DNA, Genetic Genealogy Helping to Solve the Coldest of Cold Cases, FOX
NEWS (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/dna-genetic-genealogy-helping-to-solve-thecoldest-of-cold-cases [https://perma.cc/2M58-PWJ7].
30. Id.
31. State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002).
32. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984).
33. See Charles W. Johnson & Debra L. Stephens, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law:
2019 Update, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1293 (2019) (“[T]he taking of . . . DNA samples is considered
a search within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7.”); see also State
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crime scene DNA to search public databases for family relationships
violates article I, section 7.
This Comment discusses law enforcement DNA usage and familial
DNA searching under the Washington Constitution. Part I describes DNA
and its historical use in crime scene investigations. It also discusses
modern DNA use by Washington law enforcement in particular. Part II
discusses specifics of the familial DNA searching process. Part III
outlines the history and accepted interpretation of article I, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution, particularly as it relates to DNA. Part IV
evaluates law enforcement use of familial DNA searching within the
framework of article I, section 7, concluding that this investigative
method is likely a violation of the Washington Constitution. Finally,
Part V argues that the threat to Washingtonians’ privacy presented by this
investigative technique is so great that lawmakers should not wait for the
constitutional analysis to play out in court, but instead should take active
steps to restrict Washington law enforcement’s use of familial
DNA searching.
I.

DNA AND THE HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE

A.

What is DNA?

Deoxyribonucleic acid, more commonly known as DNA, is the unique
material found in almost all organisms.34 The information contained
within DNA is made up of four chemical bases, and 99% of human DNA
is the same in all people.35 All DNA is hereditary, meaning it is passed
down to biological family members.36 Paternal ancestry, passed by fathers
to their male children, can be tracked through the Y chromosome.37
Similarly, mothers pass mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), found in the
mitochondria of cells, to all their children.38 Because mtDNA is passed in
v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367–68, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (2007) (acknowledging that DNA’s potential
to expose personal information could make it a privacy interest “in some circumstances”); State v.
Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 828–29, 147 P.3d 1201, 1238 (2006) (holding that the use of a DNA
profile did not implicate article I, section 7 because the DNA was already in the government’s
possession), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d
1134 (2014).
34. What Is DNA?, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.: MEDLINEPLUS (Feb. 11,
2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna [https://perma.cc/9K4Z-7C4W].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Rafi Letzter, How Do DNA Ancestry Tests Really Work?, LIVESCIENCE (June 4, 2018),
https://www.livescience.com/62690-how-dna-ancestry-23andme-tests-work.html
[https://perma.cc/TSY9-DFN9].
38. Id.; see What Is DNA?, supra note 34.
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this manner, it can be used to create ancestral trees.39 By obtaining access
to a family member’s DNA, one can have at least partial access to the
DNA profile of many other members of that person’s biological family,
including immediate and extended family members.40
DNA has been a useful law enforcement tool since DNA profiling was
discovered in 1984.41 Forensic DNA profiling involves matching unique
patterns in alleles (the variant forms of genes that create hereditable
traits)42 and short tandem repeats (STRs).43 In the United States, law
enforcement searches match alleles at twenty specific loci, or locations on
a person’s genome, which are non-coding and as such cannot be
connected to the person’s observable characteristics.44 Law enforcement
agencies are able to perform high-stringency searches that require all
alleles to match exactly at all loci.45 This traditional version of DNA
profiling finds exact matches between different crime scene samples, as
well as matches with DNA taken from convicted offenders and arrestees.46
Moderate and low stringency levels allow for partial matches, which can
allow the identification of potential family relationships.47 However,
existing law enforcement software is not designed to identify familial
matches,48 causing some agencies to turn towards other technology that is
designed for this purpose—technology like GEDmatch.49
B.

The History of DNA “Fingerprinting”

DNA was first used in a criminal investigation shortly after a geneticist
at the University of Leicester in England discovered its potential for
identifying unknown individuals.50 The inventor of this “DNA
fingerprinting,” as it became known, assisted police in solving two
39. A. JAMIE CUTICCHIA, GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 98 (2d ed. 2018).
40. Id.
41. DEBUS-SHERRILL & FIELD, supra note 22, at 1.
42. CUTICCHIA, supra note 39, at 28.
43. DEBUS-SHERRILL & FIELD, supra note 22, at 1.
44. Id. at 2. Observable characteristics include race, gender, and health. Id.
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.
48. For example, a search of CODIS, the national DNA database in which states participate, does
not “statistically rank partial matches or take into consideration allele frequency.” Joyce Kim, Danny
Mammo, Marni B. Siegel & Sara H. Katsanis, Policy Implications for Familial Searching, 2
INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 1, 3 (2011), http://www.investigativegenetics.com/content/2/1/22
[https://perma.cc/W4T2-GN6U].
49. Id.
50. MICHAEL LYNCH, SIMON A. COLE, RUTH MCNALLY & KATHLEEN JORDAN, TRUTH MACHINE:
THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING 49 (2008).
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rape-murder cases called the Black Pad murders in 1986 and 1987.51
Blood samples were taken from thousands of men in the local area as part
of the investigation.52 Finally, after law enforcement discovered one man
had submitted a blood sample given to him by a friend in place of his own,
the man was arrested, tested, and eventually convicted.53
DNA fingerprinting quickly migrated to the United States, where its
popularity among investigators—and moreover, the public—boomed.54
Proponents and the media lauded DNA as “the perfect fingerprint:
unfakeable, unique, and running in families.”55 The legitimacy and
perceived perfection of DNA fingerprinting was only reinforced by early
cases where challenges to the admissibility of the evidence were
unsuccessful.56 Throughout this time period, proponents and the media
continued to use the term “DNA fingerprinting” when referring to forensic
DNA use.57 Soon the public developed a steadfast love affair with DNA
in the criminal investigation and prosecution context, believing that it
could be used to provide absolute identification every time.58
However, DNA evidence as it is used today is not infallible.59 The first
successful challenge to the admissibility of DNA evidence occurred in
1989, with the New York murder trial of José Castro.60 Other successful
challenges soon followed, focusing on three main areas: (1) technical
problems with collection, handling, and analysis; (2) statistical issues with
DNA “matches;” and (3) organizational and administrative
complications.61 Despite the potential for error, DNA’s place in our
criminal justice system is deep-seated.62 Jurors today expect DNA
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. DNA fingerprinting was first used in the 1987 Florida murder trial of Tommie Lee
Andrews. Id.
55. Id. at 51 (quoting Genetic Fingerprints: Cherchez la Gene, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 1986,
at 68–69).
56. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (denying appeal based on
use of DNA evidence); New Jersey v. Williams, 599 A.2d 960, 968 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(allowing use of DNA evidence for the first time in New Jersey). In both cases, the courts determined
that DNA evidence was sufficiently reliable for use in trial. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 849–51; Williams,
599 A.2d at 967–68.
57. LYNCH ET AL., supra note 50, at 51.
58. Id.
59. Naomi Elster, How Forensic DNA Evidence Can Lead to Wrongful Convictions, JSTOR DAILY
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://daily.jstor.org/forensic-dna-evidence-can-lead-wrongful-convictions
[https://perma.cc/MPN3-DXJW].
60. LYNCH ET AL., supra note 50, at 57.
61. Id. at 57–62.
62. Id.
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evidence and it can play an important role in their decision to convict or
acquit.63 This reliance may have particularly serious implications for trials
concerning cold cases, given that the weight of potentially unreliable
DNA evidence may be overinflated when other evidence is no longer
easily accessible.
C.

DNA is Commonly Used by Washington Law Enforcement Today

Washington participates in the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS), the United States’ national DNA database.64 CODIS is “the
generic term used to describe the FBI’s program of support for criminal
justice DNA databases as well as the software used to run these
databases.”65 One part of CODIS is the FBI-sponsored National DNA
Index System (NDIS), which contains DNA from federal, state, and local
forensic laboratories.66 All fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Army,
and Puerto Rico submit DNA profiles to NDIS.67 The Washington CODIS
database includes samples from certain offenders, crime scenes, missing
persons, biological relatives of missing persons, and unidentified
recovered humans (both living and deceased).68 Samples uploaded to the
state CODIS database are automatically searched for matches.69 There are
three jurisdictional levels of CODIS (national, state, and local), each with
different criteria for when DNA profiles may be included.70
Both the state and federal databases are heavily used.71 As of November
2019, NDIS contains over fourteen million offender profiles, three million
arrestee profiles, and nearly one million forensic profiles whereas
Washington’s CODIS database contains nearly 300,000 offender profiles

63. Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, THE ATL. (June 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-doubt/480747
[https://perma.cc/J468-F9TG] (“[S]exual-assault cases involving DNA evidence . . . were twice as
likely to reach trial and 33 times as likely to result in a guilty verdict; homicide cases were 14 times
as likely to reach trial and 23 times as likely to end in a guilty verdict.”).
64. WASH. STATE PATROL, CODIS LABORATORY: THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (2017),
https://www.wsp.wa.gov/forensics/docs/crimelab/codis_brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY5VT43U].
65. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI: BIOMETRIC ANALYSIS,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/CK79-MNL7].
66. Id.
67. H.R. REP. NO. 1326, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2019).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. DEBUS-SHERRILL & FIELD, supra note 22, at 3.
71. See CODIS – NDIS Statistics, FBI: BIOMETRIC ANALYSIS, https://www.fbi.gov/services/
laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/Y9YQ-N6ZM].
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and 11,000 forensic profiles.72 In 2018, Washington State Patrol’s Crime
Laboratory Division received 11,987 samples for CODIS resulting in
643 hits.73
State statutes regulate the collection and use of DNA by Washington
law enforcement.74 DNA samples may “be used only for purposes related
to criminal investigation, identification of human remains or missing
persons, or improving the operation of the system authorized under
RCW 43.43.752 through 43.43.758.”75 A state statute also mandates DNA
collection from certain individuals, including anyone convicted of a
felony or a variety of misdemeanors, many with sexual elements.76 Unlike
some states,77 Washington does not collect DNA upon arrest, although the
legislature has considered changing this multiple times.78
72. Id.
73. WASH. STATE PATROL, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (2019).
74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.753 (2020).
75. Id.
76. See id. § 43.43.754.
(1) A biological sample must be collected for purposes of DNA identification analysis from:
(a) Every adult or juvenile individual convicted of a felony, or any of the following crimes (or
equivalent juvenile offenses):
(i) Assault in the fourth degree where domestic violence as defined in RCW 9.94A.030 was
pleaded or proven (RCW 9A.36.041, 9.94A.030);
(ii) Assault in the fourth degree with sexual motivation (RCW 9A.36.041, 9.94A.835);
(iii) Communication with a minor for immoral purposes (RCW 9.68A.090);
(iv) Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.170);
(v) Failure to register (chapter 9A.44 RCW);
(vi) Harassment (RCW 9A.46.020);
(vii) Patronizing a prostitute (RCW 9A.88.110);
(viii) Sexual misconduct with a minor in the second degree (RCW 9A.44.096);
(ix) Stalking (RCW 9A.46.110);
(x) Indecent exposure (RCW 9A.88.010);
(xi) Violation of a sexual assault protection order granted under chapter 7.90 RCW; and
(b) every adult or juvenile individual who is required to register under RCW 9A.44.130.
Id.
77. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DNA ARRESTEE LAWS 1 (2013),
https://www.ncsl.org/Documents/cj/ArresteeDNALaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/9G8N-85N7]. Thirty
states permit the collection and analysis of DNA samples from people who have been arrested or
charged with certain crimes, a practice upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v.
King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). Id.
78. See Gene Johnson, Washington Considers Collecting DNA Upon Arrest in Serious Crime,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 5, 2012, 8:19 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washingtonconsiders-collecting-dna-upon-arrest-in-serious-crime/ [https://perma.cc/GZC2-K6PC] (discussing
bills before the state legislature that would allow collection of DNA when someone is arrested for a
felony or for violating a domestic-violence protection order); see also S. 6366, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2016) (amending state law to require DNA sample collection from “adults charged with a
crime against persons, . . . residential burglary, or assault in the fourth degree”); S. 6314, 63rd Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014) (amending state law to require DNA sample collection from “adults arrested
for or charged with ranked felony offenses . . . and other crimes”).
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FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING IS A NEW ADVANCEMENT
AND LEGISLATURES HAVE ONLY RECENTLY BEGUN TO
ADDRESS IT

Law enforcement use of DNA is not a new development, but familial
DNA searching has only recently become relevant.79 This Part discusses
the intention and basic scientific parameters of familial DNA searching
and the current legal status of law enforcement use of familial DNA
searching in the United States.
A.

Familial DNA Searching Background

According to the FBI, familial DNA searching is “an intentional or
deliberate search of the database . . . for the purpose of potentially
identifying close biological relatives of the unknown forensic sample
associated with the crime scene profile.”80 Investigators using CODIS for
familial DNA searching first run a low-stringency search to identify a
relative of the perpetrator.81 This can result in hundreds of matches, so a
variety of additional measures—including additional testing and
research—are used to narrow the field.82
The samples contained in commercial DNA databases are much less
limiting.83 Customers of sites like 23andMe or Ancestry.com may
voluntarily submit the raw DNA data obtained from those sites to
GEDmatch.84 These profiles contain information about 600,000 locations
within a customer’s genome.85 These locations are identified by looking
for single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).86 SNPs are less variable
(and more likely to produce incorrect matches) than the STRs stored in
CODIS but lend themselves more readily to identifying distant relatives.87
79. See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To Genealogy Database, THE
ATL. (June 1, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-policegenealogy-database/561695/ [https://perma.cc/Z9WQ-T3V8].
80. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 65.
81. Kim et al., supra note 48, at 2.
82. Id. at 3–4. These additional measures are intended to eliminate matches which do not share a
family relationship with the target DNA and are just coincidentally similar. Id. at 3. These measures
include retesting Y-chromosome STR markers, analyzing mitochondrial DNA, inferring relationships
based on the number of shared alleles, statistical analysis, retesting with a focus on shared alleles, and
public records reviews. Id. at 3–4. However, none of these additional measures is a perfect fix for
CODIS’s inherent familial search issues. See id.
83. Zhang, supra note 79.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Because the databases owned by law enforcement are too outdated to
contain SNP information, investigators have begun using open-source
ancestry sites to solve cold cases through familial DNA searching.88 As of
2019, this meant that law enforcement had the ability to search the genetic
profiles of nearly one million GEDmatch users.89
Both the Golden State Killer and William Earl Talbott II, the suspect
from the 1987 Seattle-area double homicide,90 were identified using
GEDmatch.91 In both instances, investigators created a fake profile on the
site and uploaded crime scene DNA.92 At the time, nothing indicated to
site users that law enforcement agencies may use their data in this
manner.93 GEDmatch has since updated its terms of service, which now
expressly permit law enforcement use for certain violent crimes:
When you upload Raw Data to GEDmatch, you agree that the
Raw Data is one of the following:
Your DNA;
DNA of a person for whom you are a legal guardian;
DNA of a person who has granted you specific authorization to
upload their DNA to GEDmatch;
DNA of a person known by you to be deceased;
DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to
identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another
individual, where “violent crime” is defined as murder,
nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or
aggravated assault;
DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to identify
remains of a deceased individual;
An artificial DNA kit (if and only if: (1) it is intended for
research purposes; and (2) it is not used to identify anyone in the
GEDmatch database); or
DNA obtained from an artifact (if and only if: (1) you have a
reasonable belief that the Raw Data is DNA from a previous
owner or user of the artifact rather than from a living individual;
and (2) that previous owner or user of the artifact is known to

88. Id.
89. Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile Is Private? A Florida Judge Just Said
Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-databasesearch-warrant.html [https://perma.cc/U9GS-CMF6].
90. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
91. Id.; Green, supra note 12.
92. Zhang, supra note 79.
93. Id.
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you to be deceased).94
After this policy change, existing users were required to read the
updated terms of service in order to continue using the site.95 GEDmatch
also now allows users to opt-in or opt-out of comparison with “DNA kits
identified as being uploaded for Law Enforcement purposes”—meaning,
presumably, DNA uploaded by law enforcement in order to identify a
perpetrator or the remains of an unknown decedent.96 However, a judge
in Florida recently granted a warrant that would override the GEDmatch
opt-in requirement and allow a detective to search the full database.97
Policy experts believe that this will likely encourage other law
enforcement agencies to request similar warrants from the larger
databases, such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com—raising questions about
the efficacy of any policies the sites have restricting law
enforcement searches.98
B.

Lawmakers Are Just Now Beginning to Regulate Familial DNA
Searching

Today, familial searches conducted by police using GEDmatch and
other databases have little oversight.99 Similar activity using CODIS,
while more regulated, also lacks review because these searches are
regulated by the individual states.100 The patchwork of state and national
policies governing familial DNA searching illustrates the sporadic
regulation of this investigative technique.101 Familial DNA searching is
not performed at the national level, but Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
perform this type of search on state-government DNA databases.102
Maryland and the District of Columbia, on the other hand, have laws

94. Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm
[https://perma.cc/4AHW-GKYN] (emphasis added).
95. Debbie Kennett, Updates to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy at GEDmatch, CRUWYS
NEWS BLOG (May 21, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://cruwys.blogspot.com/2018/05/updates-to-terms-ofservice-and-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/7FP3-3PHS].
96. GEDMATCH, supra note 94.
97. Hill & Murphy, supra note 89.
98. Id.
99. Zhang, supra note 79.
100. Id.
101. See 34 U.S.C. § 40702; Sarah B. Berson, Debating DNA Collection, 264 NAT’L INST. JUST. J.
9, 10–11 (2009) (“States’ legislation requiring preconviction DNA collection varies . . . . State laws
also vary with regard to how samples may be used beyond law enforcement and quality
control purposes.”).
102. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 65.
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specifically prohibiting familial searching of their statewide databases.103
Maryland’s law prohibits anyone from “perform[ing] a search of the
statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an offender
in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biological
relative of the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”104
The District of Columbia’s law provides that DNA collected by an agency
“shall not be searched for the purpose of identifying a family member
related to the individual from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”105
Legislators considering a regulatory framework around familial DNA
searching have expressed broader concerns about the threats it may pose
to privacy rights.106 In fact, the sponsor of Maryland’s bill was specifically
concerned that use of DNA databases in this manner would be an
unreasonable search and seizure.107 As the same search technique
becomes more commonly used in Washington,108 the state constitutional
implications become relevant as well.
III. WASHINGTON’S ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 BROADLY
PROTECTS PRIVACY INTERESTS
Where the legal status of DNA searching generally in Washington is
concerned, it is well established that the collection of DNA samples is
considered a search under article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution.109 However, once a DNA sample is lawfully in police
possession, an additional warrant is not required to compare it to unrelated
cases or to evidence from a new crime scene.110 It is also a constitutional
right of all persons to refuse to consent to warrantless sampling of their
DNA.111 As of 2020, the Washington State Patrol has a consent form
103. Id.
104. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506 (LexisNexis 2020).
105. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4151 (2020).
106. Natalie Jones, Maryland House Bill Seeks to Prohibit Using Familial DNA Databases to Solve
Crime, BALT. SUN (Feb. 20, 2019, 10:29 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-mdmaryland-house-bill-dna-databases-0221-story.html [https://perma.cc/7NAF-K5BC] (“Because
DNA is genetic and is shared between relatives, your privacy could be violated by someone other
than you, and in many cases, this data could be used against you because the control of data about
you is in other people’s hands.”).
107. Id. (“[S]earching through a DNA database seems to violate both the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which both protect individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
108. See Green, supra note 12; Bessex, supra note 18; Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. Press
Release, supra note 19.
109. Johnson & Stephens, supra note 33, at 1293.
110. Id. at 1365, 1402.
111. State v. Gauthier, 174 Wash. App. 257, 163, 298 P.3d 126, 130 (2013).
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online to be used when collecting DNA from a family member in order to
potentially identify a missing person.112 But there is no such form for
collecting DNA from a family member in order identify a suspect or
compare it to crime scene DNA.113
Although Washington does not have a statute that addresses familial
DNA searching, residents of the state can still rely on article I, section 7
of the Washington Constitution. This Part reviews the existing article I,
section 7 jurisprudence and the protections it offers, the courts’ objective
and adaptive applications of article I, section 7 to new technologies, and
article I, section 7 cases related specifically to DNA.
A.

Washington Courts Have Long Maintained that Article I, Section 7
is More Protective than the Fourth Amendment

Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution states: “No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.”114 The Supreme Court of Washington has repeatedly
held that “authority of law” can be provided by a warrant based on
probable cause or one of the “few ‘jealously and carefully drawn
exceptions’ to the warrant requirement.”115 These exceptions are: consent,
searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, plain view,
investigative stops, and exigent circumstances.116 The exigent
circumstances exception applies when “obtaining a warrant . . . would
compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction
of evidence.”117
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that article I, section 7 is
more protective of individual privacy rights than the Fourth
Amendment.118 The 1889 State Constitutional Convention explicitly
112. WASH. STATE PATROL: CRIME LAB’Y DIV., CONSENT FOR FAMILY REFERENCE
SAMPLE COLLECTION, TESTING, AND CODIS ENTRY (Dec. 2018), https://wsp.wa.gov/
forensics/docs/crimelab/consent_family_reference.docx [https://perma.cc/TF3J-GZVY] (form).
113. See
generally
Crime
Laboratory
Division,
WASH.
STATE
PATROL,
http://www.wsp.wa.gov/forensics/crimlabs.htm [https://perma.cc/AW74-WGYH].
114. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
115. State v. Witkowski, 3 Wash. App. 2d 318, 336, 415 P.3d 639, 648 (2018); State v. Houser, 95
Wash. 2d 143, 149, 622 P2d 1218, 1222 (1980) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
759 (1979)).
116. State v. Hendrikson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
117. State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash. 2d 364, 370, 236 P.3d 885, 888 (2010) (quoting State v. Smith,
165 Wash. 2d 511, 517, 199 P.3d 386, 389 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118. State v. Jones, 146 Wash. 2d 328, 332, 45 P.3d 1062, 1064 (2002) (“[I]t is well settled that
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection to individual privacy
rights than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV
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rejected a state provision identical to Fourth Amendment in favor of the
broader version seen the Washington Constitution today, in part to ensure
that “interests that were threatened by new technologies” would be
protected.119 This was likely due in part to the failure of the United States
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States120 to extend the Fourth
Amendment’s protections to broader privacy interests such as “personal
security, personal liberty, and private property.”121
Two cases in particular elucidate the differences between the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 7. In one case, State v. Boland,122 the
Supreme Court of Washington considered the constitutionality of law
enforcement searching a defendant’s curbside trash can without a
warrant.123 Just two years prior, the United States Supreme Court had held
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment in items discarded in curbside garbage.124 Notwithstanding
the United States Supreme Court’s decision, the Supreme Court of
Washington found that law enforcement’s search of a trash can was an
intrusion of a private affair and thus protected by article I, section 7.125
Although acknowledging that it may not be unreasonable for a third party
to search another’s trash, the Court’s majority stated that “average persons
would find it reasonable to believe the garbage they place in their trash
cans will be protected from warrantless governmental intrusion.”126 In
(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”).
Washington courts previously utilized the six criteria established by the Supreme Court of
Washington in State v. Gunwall to determine when the Washington constitution is more protective
than the U.S. Constitution. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66, 720 P.2d 808, 814–15 (1986). The six Gunwall
criteria are: (1) “The textual language of the State Constitution”; (2) “Significant differences in the
texts of parallel provisions in the federal and state constitutions”; (3) “State constitutional and
common law history”; (4) “Preexisting state law”; (5) “Differences in structure between the federal
and state constitutions”; and (6) “Matters of particular state interest or local concern.” Id. Because
once the Court has done such an analysis on a specific legal issue it declines to do so again,
Washington courts no longer perform this analysis on these two constitutional provisions where
privacy rights are concerned. State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 348, 979 P.2d 833, 837 (1999).
119. Charles W. Johnson & Scott P. Beetham, The Origin of Article I, Section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 431, 446 (2008); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 178,
622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980).
120. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
121. Johnson & Beetham, supra note 119, at 447 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627).
122. 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).
123. Id. at 574, 800 P.2d at 1113.
124. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988).
125. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 578, 800 P.2d at 1116.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
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sum, garbage in trash cans is protected from governmental intrusion by
the Washington Constitution, but not its federal counterpart.
The second case established that article I, section 7 requires
individualized suspicion to be present before a search.127 In City of Seattle
v. Mesiani,128 a group of plaintiffs challenged a sobriety checkpoint
program orchestrated by the city.129 All motorists were stopped at the
checkpoints, “without warrants or individualized suspicion of any
criminal activity.”130 Finding that the checkpoints involved seizures, the
Court then determined that they did not fall within an exception to the
warrant requirement.131 Based on this, the Court held that the checkpoints
were a violation of both article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment.132
However, this ruling was in direct contrast to a United States Supreme
Court case, two years after Mesiani, in which that Court held that a similar
sobriety checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.133
Together, Boland and Mesiani illustrate how protective Washington
courts are of individual privacy rights under article I, section 7. These
cases also illustrate how this portion of the Washington Constitution is
more protective than its federal counterpart when compared to similar
cases involving the privacy interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment.134

127. See City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 455, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988).
128. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
129. Id. at 455, 755 P.2d at 776.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 457, 755 P.2d at 777. The city argued that the searches were permitted under a previous
Washington case. Id. at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d at 777 n.1 (citing State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185,
605 P.2d 1279 (1980)). The Court rejected this argument, as that case was “limited to situations in
which there was reliable information that a serious felony had recently been committed . . . far
different from an inference from statistics that there are inebriated drivers in the area.” Id. (citation
omitted).
132. Id. at 457–60, 755 P.2d at 777–78.
133. Id. at 460, 755 P.2d at 778; Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). One
Washington Court of Appeals stated that while Sitz “imperiled” the Fourth Amendment holding in
Mesiani, “Mesiani . . . survive[s] since it rested primarily on [article I, section 7].” City of Seattle v.
Yeager, 67 Wash. App. 41, 49 & n.4, 834 P.2d 73, 77 & n.4 (1992).
134. Compare State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1990) (holding that
a privacy right to trash on the curb was protected under article I, section 7), with California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that a warrantless search of trash on the curb was
permitted under the Fourth Amendment). Compare Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 460, 755 P.2d at 778
(holding that a sobriety checkpoint program violated article I, section 7), with Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455
(holding that a sobriety checkpoint program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment).
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Private Affairs Are Objective and Guarded Against Technological
Advancement

Under article I, section 7, a search occurs when the State disturbs
“those privacy interests which citizens of [Washington] have held, and
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a
warrant.”135 In determining whether something is a private affair, courts
“look at the ‘nature and extent of the information which may be obtained
as a result of the government conduct’ and at the historical treatment of
the interest asserted.”136 This “interest asserted”137 encompasses all
“private affairs,”138 in contrast to the Fourth Amendment’s limited
protection of “a person, his house, papers and effects,”139 and has included
land,140 temporary lodgings,141 driver’s records held by the government,142
automobile trunks,143 and DNA.144 Voluntary exposure can negate an
asserted privacy interest.145
Three cases exemplify how the courts weigh objective and actual
expectations of privacy under article I, section 7. These cases show that
individuals in Washington are entitled to privacy in more than just their
possessions. In State v. Jorden,146 law enforcement officers performed
random warrant checks on the names in the guest registry at a motel, as
was their practice.147 Guests were asked for identification and told it
would be kept on file, but were “not told of the possibility for random,
suspicionless searches of the registry by law enforcement.”148 Upon
finding outstanding felony warrants for Timothy Jorden, officers entered

135. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984).
136. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 869, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014) (quoting State v. Miles, 160
Wash. 2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864, 868 (2007)).
137. Id. at 869, 319 P.3d at 12.
138. Id. at 868, 319 P.3d at 12.
139. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
140. Id.
141. State v. Jorden, 160 Wash. 2d 121, 126, 156 P.3d 893, 896 (2007).
142. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash. 2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46, 50 (2002).
143. State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 767, 958 P.2d 982, 985 (1998).
144. State v. Athan. 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367–68, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (2007).
145. Id. at 366, 158 P.3d at 33.
146. 160 Wash. 2d 121, 156 P.3d 893 (2007).
147. Id. at 123–24, 156 P.3d at 894–95. The program, called the “Lakewood Crime-Free Hotel
Motel Program,” encouraged police to “review the guest registries of hotels and motels on a random
basis and without individualized or particularized suspicion.” Id. This review included random
criminal checks of names in the guest registries. Id.
148. Id. at 124, 156 P.3d at 895.
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his motel room and found drug paraphernalia and crack cocaine.149 Jorden
then appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance.150 In determining that Jorden’s hotel room was indeed a
“private affair” with article I, section 7 protection, one thing key to the
Supreme Court of Washington’s analysis was “the nature of the
information sought—that is, whether the information obtained via the
governmental trespass reveal[ed] intimate or discrete details of a person’s
life.”151 The Court reiterated its distaste for “fishing expedition[s]”
without “an individualized or particularized suspicion about the search
subject” in deeming the search of Jorden’s room unconstitutional.152
Five years earlier, in State v. McKinney,153 the Court addressed three
consolidated cases concerning the arrest of three defendants after law
enforcement encountered their vehicles in public and subsequently
accessed their information, including vehicle registration and driver’s
records.154 The Court’s analysis afforded significance to the historical lack
of “a constitutionally protected privacy interest in . . . drivers’ records.”155
In fact, the Court noted, vehicle ownership information was originally
available to the public “upon request for one dollar.”156 Although the
historical analysis did not support article I, section 7 protection, the Court
continued on to see if such protection was one Washington citizens
“should be entitled to hold” in this particular area.157 As a part of this
expectation analysis, the Court considered “the extent to which the subject
matter [was] voluntarily exposed to the public,” as “generally, what is
voluntarily exposed to the public is not considered to be a part of a
person’s private affairs.”158 Ultimately, the Court found “no protected
privacy interest in the information contained in a DOL driver’s record”
because of the lack of historical privacy, “the fact that these records reveal
little about a person’s associations, financial dealings, or movements,”
and the government’s existing ownership of the records.159

149. Id. at 124–25, 156 P.3d at 895.
150. Id. at 125, 156 P.3d at 895.
151. Id. at 126, 156 P.3d at 896 (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 130, 156 P.3d at 898.
153. 148 Wash. 2d 20, 60 P.3d 46 (2002).
154. Id. at 24–25, 60 P.3d at 47–48.
155. Id. at 27, 60 P.3d at 49.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 29, 60 P.3d at 50 (emphasis in original) (quoting City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.
2d 260, 270, 868 P.2d 134, 139 (1994)).
158. Id. at 29, 31, 60 P.3d at 50, 51.
159. Id. at 32, 60 P.3d at 52.
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And finally, in State v. White,160 the Court considered the opening of a
locked car trunk by law enforcement during a warrantless inventory
search.161 In this case, the government argued that the existence of a trunk
release button in the unlocked glove compartment made the search
lawful.162 In deciding that such a search was a violation of the defendant’s
article I, section 7 privacy rights, the Court stated: “The fact an
automobile may have a trunk release mechanism does not diminish an
individual’s privacy interests.”163 The privacy interests created by the
locked trunk were ultimately the most significant to the Court, as opposed
to the method of access.164 The Court reiterated that “[t]he analysis under
article I, section 7 focuses, not on a defendant’s actual or subjective
expectation of privacy but, as we have previously established, on those
privacy interests Washington citizens held in the past and are entitled to
hold in the future.”165 These cases show that Washington courts have
protected Washingtonians’ privacy interests in parts of their lives that are
far less personal than their family relationships and DNA.
Furthermore, Washington courts have been consistent in guarding
privacy interests against technological advancement. For example, in
State v. Myrick,166 the Supreme Court of Washington illustrated the
relationship between new technologies and article I, section 7.167 “Merely
because it is generally known that the technology exists to enable police
to view private activities from an otherwise nonintrusive vantage point,”
the Court stated, “it does not follow that these activities are without
protection.”168 The Court was considering whether law enforcement
violated article I, section 7 when officers observed marijuana growing on
a defendant’s property, which was “heavily wooded and bordered by high
ridges which precluded casual observation,” from a plane flying 1,500 feet
above ground level.169 The State argued that because the open fields were
in public view, they were not “private affairs” and as such were not
protected.170 The Court ultimately held that the warrant issued as a result

160. 135 Wash. 2d 761, 958 P.2d 982 (1998).
161. Id. at 763–65, 958 P.2d at 983–84.
162. Id. at 766, 958 P.2d at 984.
163. Id. at 767, 958 P.2d at 985.
164. Id. at 767–68, 958 P.2d at 985.
165. Id. at 768, 958 P.2d at 985 (citing State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510–11, 688 P.2d 151,
153–54 (1984)).
166. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
167. Id. at 508, 688 P.2d at 152.
168. Id. at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
169. Id. at 508, 688 P.2d at 152.
170. Id. at 510, 688 P.2d at 153.
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of this unconstitutional search was harmless error, but not before
expressly rejecting an analysis that “rests solely on the legitimacy of a
defendant’s subjective expectations of privacy.”171 Myrick shows that the
protections provided by article I, section 7 are not subjective and do not
diminish as technology reduces citizens’ expectations of privacy.172 This
stands in contrast to the Fourth Amendment’s “subjective and reasonable
expectation of privacy” standard.173
Text messages are also a private affair, even if the phone is in police
custody at the time the messages are received.174 In State v. Hinton,175 a
person’s phone was receiving calls and messages while he was in police
custody.176 An officer used the phone to respond to a text from Shawn
Hinton, arranged a drug transaction, and arrested Hinton upon his
arrival.177 The Court found it significant that “[t]ext messages can
encompass the same intimate subjects as phone calls, sealed letters, and
other traditional forms of communication that have historically been
strongly protected under Washington law.”178 The government argued that
Hinton lost his privacy interest over his phone, although he had no control
over his receipt of a text message, but the Court stated: “Given the realities
of modern life, the mere fact that an individual shares information with
another party and does not control the area from which that information
is accessed does not place it outside the realm of article I, section 7’s
protection.”179 The interests the Court protects under this section are those
that should be protected where the government is concerned, not those
that are actually protected from the broader public as a result of
technical advancement.
C.

The Supreme Court of Washington Has Considered the Use of
DNA by Law Enforcement Under Article I, Section 7
Multiple Times

Although the Court has not addressed the article I, section 7
implications of using DNA for familial DNA searching directly, it has

171. Id. at 513, 515, 688 P.2d at 155, 156.
172. Id. at 513, 688 P.2d at 155.
173. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868, 319 P.3d 9, 12 (2014) (citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967)).
174. Id. at 877–78, 319 P.3d at 16–17.
175. 179 Wash. 2d 862, 319 P.3d 9 (2014).
176. Id. at 865–66, 319 P.3d at 11.
177. Id. at 866, 319 P.3d at 11.
178. Id. at 869–70, 319 P.3d at 13.
179. Id. at 873, 319 P.3d at 15.
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previously established that there is a privacy interest in the human body
and bodily functions.180 However, the privacy interest in a person’s DNA
depends in large part on how that DNA was obtained.181 The earliest
discussion of DNA evidence in Washington can be found in cases starting
in the mid-1990s.182 Since then, the Supreme Court of Washington has
considered DNA use and collection numerous times.183 The analysis it
applied in considering other DNA privacy issues, including mandatory
collection of certain groups’ DNA184 and the testing of DNA that is
already in law enforcement possession,185 illustrates the framework and
relevant factors to consider when analyzing the constitutionality of
familial DNA searching.
First, in State v. Olivas,186 the defendants entered guilty pleas for
various violent and sexual offenses.187 Each defendant challenged
subsequent orders authorizing the State to perform DNA blood tests,
despite their guilty pleas, as authorized by state statute.188 Although the
defendants argued that the DNA tests were unconstitutional under both
the federal and state constitutions, the Court declined to address the state
constitutional claims on procedural grounds.189 Under the Fourth
Amendment, however, the Court upheld the statute as constitutional based
on a special needs analysis, balancing “the general privacy right of
persons . . . against the ‘special needs beyond normal law enforcement’ of
the government.”190 In a concurring opinion, Justice Utter instead
180. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452, 465 (2000) (“[T]he
privacy interest in the body and bodily functions is one Washington citizens have held, and should be
entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass.”).
181. See State v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367, 158 P.3d 27, 33 (2007) (“Certainly the
nonconsensual collection of blood or urine samples in some circumstances . . . invokes privacy
concerns; however, obtaining the saliva sample in this case did not involve an invasive or
involuntary procedure.”).
182. See State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 37, 882 P.2d 747, 759 (1994); State v. Olivas, 122
Wash. 2d 73, 76, 856 P.2d 1076, 1077 (1993); State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash. 2d 525, 538, 852 P.2d
1064, 1071 (1993).
183. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 365–75, 158 P.3d at 32–38; State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 72–
82, 156 P.3d 208, 211–16 (2007); State v. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 820–29, 147 P.3d 1201, 1234–
39 (2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).
184. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 74, 156 P.3d at 212; Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 76, 856 P.2d at 1077.
185. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 825, 147 P.3d at 1236; Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 365–75, 158 P.3d
at 32–38.
186. 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993).
187. Id. at 76–80, 856 P.2d at 1077–79.
188. Id. at 76, 856 P.2d at 1077; see WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2020).
189. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d at 81–82, 856 P.2d at 1080 (finding the defendants failed to brief the
“six nonexclusive [Gunwall] factors [that] must be briefed before this court will consider an
independent state constitutional claim”).
190. Id. at 97–98, 856 P.2d at 1088–89.
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advocated for a minimally intrusive search test where courts would
“balance the government’s interest in conducting the search, the degree to
which the search actually advances that interest, and the gravity of the
intrusion upon personal privacy.”191
The same question was raised fourteen years later, in State v. Surge.192
Six defendants were convicted of felonies and challenged the same state
DNA statute193 considered in Olivas.194 In its state constitutional analysis,
the Court focused specifically on “the narrow class of individuals who
ha[d] been convicted of the listed crimes” in the statute as opposed to “the
privacy interests of the ordinary citizen.”195 The Court held that no private
affair had been disturbed and also compared the collection of felons’ DNA
to the “well established practice of government to collect fingerprints
from convicted felons for identification purposes.”196 The Court afforded
significance to the fact that the statute only required DNA collection for
identification, which the Court did not consider “a disturbance of [the
defendants’] private affairs.”197 Since the defendants had been convicted,
they no longer had privacy interest in their identity and the Court viewed
the DNA collected as just another component of that identity.198
In 2006, the Court in State v. Gregory199 addressed the question of what
privacy rights a defendant has when the State already possesses the
person’s DNA profile.200 Allen Gregory was found guilty of three counts
of rape in the first degree for a 1998 rape.201 Law enforcement had
previously suspected Gregory of the 1996 murder of a neighbor, but had
no way to definitively connect him.202 While he was incarcerated and
awaiting trial for the 1998 rape, DNA analysis of semen found at the 1996
scene was compared to blood samples obtained in the 1998 rape.203
Finding a match, the State charged Gregory with the 1996 murder, for
which the jury found him guilty and sentenced him to death.204 On appeal,

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 104, 856 P.2d at 1092 (Utter, J., concurring).
160 Wash. 2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754.
State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 69–70, 156 P.3d 208, 210 (2007).
Id. at 72, 156 P.3d at 211.
Id. at 74, 156 P.3d at 212.
Id. at 74, 156 P.3d at 212–13.
Id. at 75, 156 P.3d at 213.
158 Wash. 2d 759, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006).
Id. at 822, 147 P.3d at 1234.
Id. at 778, 147 P.3d at 1212.
Id. at 812, 147 P.3d at 1229.
Id.
Id. at 812, 147 P.3d at 1229–30.
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Gregory asserted that he had “an expectation of privacy in the information
contained in his blood . . . and a separate probable cause determination
was required to support its comparison with the semen collected from the
[1996] crime scene.”205 The Court concluded that article I, section 7 was
not implicated “because no additional search occurs when a defendant’s
DNA profile already in the State’s possession is compared against
evidence taken from a new crime scene.”206
The Court examined the constitutional implications of covert DNA
collection procedures in State v. Athan.207 Police suspected, but were
unable to charge, John Nicholas Athan in the 1982 murder of
thirteen-year-old Kristen Sumstad, whose nude body was found with
semen in her vagina and on her leg.208 Twenty years later, cold case
detectives tested preserved DNA from the crime scene against state and
federal databases without success and decided to locate Athan in order to
compare his DNA to that from the crime scene.209 Because Athan now
lived in New Jersey, detectives posed as a law firm and “sent Athan a
letter inviting him to join a fictitious class action lawsuit concerning
parking tickets.”210 The State then obtained DNA from saliva on the
envelope containing Athan’s reply, compared it to the semen found on
Sumstad’s body, and arrested Athan based on the match between the
two.211 The Court began its analysis by finding “no inherent privacy
interest in saliva.”212 Because Athan willingly licked the envelope, the
Court compared it “to a person spitting on the sidewalk or leaving a
cigarette butt in an ashtray.”213 However, the Court limited this analysis
to the facts present in the case, where the DNA was used for identification
only.214 Although it acknowledged in its article I, section 7 analysis that
“DNA has the potential to reveal a vast amount of personal information,
including medical conditions and familial relations,” the Court pointed
out that once Athan sent the letter, what was done with it—including DNA
testing—was outside of his control.215
DNA and its use by law enforcement fall within the purview of article I,
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 825, 147 P.3d at 1236.
Id. at 828, 147 P.3d at 1238.
160 Wash. 2d 354, 158 P.3d 27 (2007).
Id. at 362–63, 158 P.3d at 31.
Id. at 363, 158 P.3d at 31.
Id.
Id. at 363–64, 158 P.3d at 32.
Id. at 367, 158 P.3d at 33.
Id. at 367, 158 P.3d at 33–34.
Id. at 368, 158 P.3d at 34.
Id. at 367–68, 158 P.3d at 34.
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section 7;216 thus, courts will need to consider the factors identified as
important by the Supreme Court of Washington in the cases above. It is
necessary to consider this new investigative method under the existing
article I, section 7 framework because this provision of the Washington
Constitution is specifically intended to guard privacy rights from threats
created by “technological advancements.”217 Because familial DNA
searching has advanced, it is now ripe for consideration.
IV. THE CONNECTIONS FOUND THROUGH FAMILIAL DNA
SEARCHING ARE A PRIVATE AFFAIR AND SHOULD BE
PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
The accepted framework for an article I, section 7 analysis considers:
(1) the nature and extent of the information which may be obtained;
(2) the historical treatment of the interest asserted; and (3) the existence
of authority of law in the form of a warrant or exception to the warrant
requirement.218 Applying this framework to familial DNA searching as
currently practiced using commercial DNA databases like GEDmatch
shows that it is very likely unconstitutional.
A.

The Nature and Extent of the Information that May Be Obtained by
Familial DNA Searching Supports Article I, Section 7 Protections

The first question in an article I, section 7 analysis is the “nature and
extent of the information which may be obtained as a result of the
governmental conduct.”219 When considering the privacy implications of
third parties revealing sensitive information about others, Washington
courts consider the method by which the information is obtained as well
as the “personal details” revealed by the information itself.220 In cases
involving familial DNA searching, although law enforcement utilizes the
DNA collected at the crime scene in order to perform the search, the
information at issue is the family connections and relationships made
available through the search. Indeed, if the issue was only the DNA itself,
under Athan there is little question that a court would find no privacy
216. See id. at 365–68, 158 P.3d at 33–34.
217. See State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 877–78, 319 P.3d 9, 17 (2014) (“Article I, section 7
protects Washington citizens from governmental intrusion into affairs that they should be entitled to
hold safe from governmental trespass, regardless of technological advancements.”).
218. Id. at 868–69, 319 P.3d at 12 (citing State v. Miles, 160 Wash. 2d 236, 244, 156 P.3d 864, 868
(2007)); State v. Witkowski, 3 Wash. App. 2d 318, 336, 415 P.3d 639, 648 (2018).
219. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wash. 2d 577, 586, 451 P.3d 1060, 1069 (2019) (quoting Miles, 160
Wash. 2d at 244, 156 P.3d at 868).
220. Id. at 586–87, 451 P.3d at 1069.
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interest inherent in it.221
In cases involving familial DNA searching, however, law enforcement
departs from the realm of simple DNA identification and enters that of the
“vast amount of personal information, including . . . familial relations”
acknowledged by the Athan Court.222 In identifying a suspect through
familial DNA searching, the government implicates the personal
information of at least two individuals—the suspect themselves and the
family member (or members) who uploaded their information to the
commercial database—as well as the connection between them.223
The method through which law enforcement obtains the familial
connections through familial DNA searching demonstrates that these
connections are a “private affair.” Like GPS devices and infrared thermal
devices, these websites do not “merely augment [an] officer[’s] senses.”224
Although an officer can arguably identify family relationships through
context and official documents, an officer cannot build a family tree based
on DNA out to a third or fourth cousin relationship without this
technology. Familial DNA searching enables law enforcement to replace
traditional senses and investigatory techniques with a “technological
substitute.”225 This enhancement is evidenced by the use of this new
technology to solve cold cases, where traditional investigatory methods
have failed for years.226 The Golden State Killer crimes, the Michella
Welch murder, and the murders of Jay Cook and Tanya van Cuylenberg
all took place in the 1970s and 1980s—but none of the men eventually
arrested decades later were ever suspects prior to being identified by
familial DNA searching.227 Because familial DNA searching is not merely
an augmentation of existing senses, the genetic family relationships are a
private affair that would not be identified without the technology.
The Supreme Court of Washington has already indicated that the type
of personal information identified through familial DNA searching may
be indicative of a private affair.228 Given that the potential for text
221. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 367, 158 P.3d at 33 (finding no inherent privacy interest in saliva).
222. Id. at 367–68, 158 P.3d at 34.
223. See supra section II.A.
224. State v. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d 251, 262, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (2003); see State v. Young, 123
Wash. 2d 173, 182–84, 867 P.2d 593, 597–98 (1994).
225. Jackson, 150 Wash. 2d at 262, 76 P.3d at 223.
226. Romano, supra note 2; Clare McGrane, Patricia Murphy & Alec Cowan, This Horrific Cold
Case Could Be Solved by Tracing the Murderer’s Family Tree, KUOW (June 25, 2019 10:05 PM),
https://www.kuow.org/stories/the-horrific-cold-case-that-might-be-solved-by-tracing-the-suspect-sfamily-tree [https://perma.cc/3YL7-2VKK].
227. See Romano, supra note 2; McGrane et al., supra note 226; Bessex, supra note 18.
228. State v. Athan, 160 Wash. 2d 354, 367–68, 158 P.3d 27, 34 (2007) (declining to consider the
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messages to reveal details about familial associations has weighed in favor
of article I, section 7 protection,229 the detailed family tree that can be
created based on DNA surely weighs in favor of this same protection.
Even assuming that a person’s readily visible family relationships are easy
to identify, genetic family relationships will not always be the same, nor
will they be readily identifiable.230 Thus, the nature and extent of private
information that a family tree based on DNA can provide is expansive.
B.

The Historical Treatment of the Privacy Interest Asserted in DNA,
Identity, and Family Relationships Supports Article I, Section 7
Protections

The historical treatment of three different privacy interests are relevant
to an article I, section 7 analysis of familial DNA searches: DNA,231
identity,232 and family relationships.233 The historical treatment of DNA is
mixed and highly dependent on how the DNA was obtained.234 The crime
scene DNA does not in and of itself implicate article I, section 7, because
it is already in the government’s possession.235 That DNA in these cases
would present a nearly identical analysis to that of the DNA contained in
the defendant’s semen in Gregory.236 However, unlike the DNA hosted
on the commercial DNA databases, Gregory’s comparison sample was
already in the government’s possession.237 The DNA of the family
member who used the database, in contrast, was not. Thus, the privacy
interest in the comparison DNA is no different than the interest any other
Washington resident has in theirs, meaning it is protected.
potential for DNA to reveal medical conditions and familial relations in that particular case, but
calling the concerns themselves valid).
229. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 868–70, 319 P.3d 9, 12–13 (2014).
230. See FED. INTERAGENCY F. ON CHILD & FAM. STATS., AMERICA’S CHILDREN: KEY NATIONAL
INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING, 2019, at 2–3 (2019), https://www.childstats.gov/pdf/ac2019/ac_19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y2NJ-XP2J] (finding that 3.1 million children did not live with a parent in 2018,
25% of which lived with nonrelatives).
231. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 366–67, 158 P.3d at 33; State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 72–74,
156 P.3d 208, 211–12 (2007); State v. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d 759, 828, 147 P.3d 1201, 1237–38
(2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R., Jr., 181 Wash. 2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014);
State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 92–93, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (1993).
232. See Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 72–73, 156 P.3d at 211–12.
233. See Athan, 160 Wash. 2d at 367–68, 158 P.3d at 34.
234. Compare Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 828, 147 P.3d at 1238 (holding defendant had no privacy
interest in DNA already in the State’s possession), with Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 72–74, 156 P.3d at
211–12 (suggesting that ordinary citizens would have a privacy interest in their identity if faced with
mandatory DNA sampling).
235. Gregory, 158 Wash. 2d at 828, 147 P.3d at 1238.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 812, 147 P.3d at 1229.
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There are strong indicators of a historical privacy interest in their
identity for the suspects who did not willingly participate in the database.
Washington courts have previously recognized a right to privacy in one’s
identity.238 This interest has previously been overcome when those
asserting it are incarcerated felons239 or the subject of a Public Records
Act240 request,241 but even the family members who voluntarily put their
DNA information in an online database have not completely removed
their privacy interests from the protection of article I, section 7.242
Historically, courts are protective of identity absent a clear surrender of
this interest. Here, it is unlikely that the defendants would be able to
challenge the violation of their contributing family member’s
constitutional rights.243 However, the defendant may be able to bring a
constitutional challenge because of the privacy interest in their own
identity, which is necessarily linked to the family member’s DNA in
the database.244
Two (or more) parties could assert a privacy interest in the implicated
family connections—the owner of the crime scene DNA and any family
member whose DNA is in the commercial database.245 Because the
suspect at the time of the search has presumably not been convicted of
anything, their privacy interest in their family connections and identity is
that of an ordinary citizen and this same analysis applies to all members
of the family.246 The difference, in fact, is between the members of the
238. Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of Puyallup, 172 Wash. 2d 398, 414, 259 P.3d 190, 198
(2011) (holding that a police officer maintains his right to privacy in his identity despite media
coverage); Bellevue John Does 1–11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wash. 2d 199, 205, 212,
189 P.3d 139, 142, 146 (2008) (holding that teachers facing unsubstantiated allegations of abuse have
a right to privacy in their identities).
239. See Surge, 160 Wash. 2d at 72, 156 P.3d at 211.
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2020).
241. See Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss, 194
Wash. 2d 484, 502, 450 P.3d 601, 610 (2019) (holding that birth dates of state employees are not
exempt from disclosure).
242. State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 873, 319 P.3d 9, 15 (2014) (“[T]he mere fact that an
individual shares information with another party and does not control the area from which that
information is accessed does not place it outside the realm of article I, section 7’s protection.”).
243. See id. at 869 n.2, 319 P.3d at 12 n.2 (“Generally, article I, section 7 rights may be enforced
by exclusion of evidence only at the instance of one whose own privacy rights were infringed by
government action.”).
244. Id. (“Hinton had standing to challenge the search of Lee’s phone if the search disturbed a
privacy interest he had in his text messages to Lee.”).
245. See supra section II.A.
246. State v. Surge, 160 Wash. 2d 65, 72, 156 P.3d 208, 211 (2007) (“In this case, the ‘private
affairs’ inquiry focuses on a convicted felon’s asserted privacy interest in his or her identity, not on
the privacy interests of the ordinary citizen. The distinction is important to our inquiry because the
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family who chose to put their DNA into the commercial database, and
those, including the suspect, who did not.
Washington courts have previously acknowledged a privacy interest in
family relationships. In determining that cell-site location information is
a private affair, the Supreme Court of Washington considered that this
data “can expose personal details about family, politics, religion, and
sexual associations.”247 The Court, although declining to adopt an
evidentiary privilege for parent-child communications, also stated in dicta
that there is a “familial right to privacy . . . [which] extends to
fundamental personal rights.”248 This assertion is supported on the federal
level by the series of United States Supreme Court cases that have
protected family privacy and autonomy.249
Thus, when viewing the intersection of genetic identity and privacy at
the heart of the issue, the historical treatment of both weighs in favor of
protection under article I, section 7. Since familial DNA searching is
unconstitutional, it cannot support a search warrant to confirm a suspect’s
DNA match with the original crime scene DNA.250 Any taking of the
suspect’s DNA to determine a match with the crime scene DNA,
therefore, would need to rest on other grounds or fall within one of the
narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.251
V.

THE CASE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Washingtonians like their privacy. In January 2020, ten privacy-related
bills, including a new version of the Washington Privacy Act,252 were
introduced in the state legislative session.253 The Washington Privacy Act
itself states, “Washingtonians cherish privacy as an element of their
individual freedom,” and “Washington is a technology leader on a

statute involved in this case applies only to the narrow class of individuals who have been convicted
of the listed crimes, and the focus must be on their rights.”).
247. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wash. 2d 577, 589, 451 P.3d 1060, 1070 (2019) (emphasis added).
248. State v. Maxon, 110 Wash. 2d 564, 570, 756 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1988).
249. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
541–42 (1942) (procreation).
250. See State v. Ross, 141 Wash. 2d 304, 311–12, 4 P.3d 130, 135 (2000) (laying out the
consequences of a search violating article I, section 7).
251. Id. at 312, 4 P.3d at 135.
252. S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (Second Substitute Senate Bill 5376).
253. Pollyanna Sanderson, Katelyn Ringrose & Stacey Gray, It’s Raining Privacy Bills: An
Overview of the Washington State Privacy Act and Other Introduced Bills, FUTURE OF PRIV. F. (Jan.
13, 2020), https://fpf.org/2020/01/13/its-raining-privacy-bills-an-overview-of-the-washington-stateprivacy-act-and-other-introduced-bills/ [https://perma.cc/C3A4-TTCR].
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national and global level.”254 Despite this, the Washington Privacy Act
does not mention DNA,255 nor do nine other privacy bills from
the session.256
The only current bill that addresses DNA privacy is still in committee
review as of November 2020 and falls far short of what Washington
residents need.257 This bill specifically concerns the “collection, use, and
disclosure of genetic data by direct-to-consumer genetic testing
companies” and lays out a series of requirements for these entities when
handling consumer genetic data.258 However, when it comes to law
enforcement involvement, the bill merely demands “valid legal process
for disclosing genetic data to law enforcement without a consumer’s
express consent.”259 This requirement is insufficient to adequately protect
privacy rights. First, following a valid legal process will not absolve
familial DNA searching of the sin of violating Washingtonians’ privacy
rights. Second, the consumer’s consent does not mean that the consumer’s
family, also implicated in these searches, has consented.260
If Washington truly aspires to protect its residents’ highly valued
privacy, it should follow the lead of Maryland and the District of
Columbia and institute a law prohibiting familial DNA searching, but then
go further to prohibit law enforcement searches of this type on both
government and commercial DNA databases.261 Although a court would
likely find that this type of investigative method is unconstitutional under
the Washington Constitution,262 there is no need for the legislature to wait
for this to play out in the courts. The legislature can move more quickly
and act to adequately protect the privacy interests of all Washington
residents in their DNA and the information it contains.
And so the legislature should. Whatever the constitutional implications,
permitting such law enforcement use of this technology is no different
than permitting distant family members to give consent for a blood draw
on behalf of one another. Washington does not allow the collection of

254. S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess., at § 2(a)–(b) (Wash. 2019) (Second Substitute Senate
Bill 5376).
255. See id.
256. See Sanderson et al., supra note 253.
257. See H.R. 2485, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020).
258. Id. at 1.
259. Id. § 2(1)(c).
260. See supra section IV.A.
261. See supra section I.B.
262. See supra Part IV.
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arrestee DNA,263 and allowing law enforcement to obtain the DNA of
citizens in this backdoor manner violates the privacy that citizens of the
state so cherish. Although familial DNA searching is likely
unconstitutional,264 it may take some time for the courts to reach this issue.
Securing this important privacy right through the legislative process will
send a clear message to law enforcement that such use of these websites
is unacceptable to Washingtonians. Given the potential for permanent
harm to individual and family privacy, the legislature will be failing
present and future constituents by sitting idly by.
CONCLUSION
The use of familial DNA searching to solve crimes is increasing.265 In
Washington, one county alone has used this technique to solve three cold
murder cases in the past year.266 When doing these searches, law
enforcement checks crime scene DNA against commercial and open
source DNA databases that very likely contain samples uploaded without
the consumer knowing they could be used in this manner.267 These are not
small databases—they contain millions of samples and can be used to
identify the majority of the American public.268
This leaves Washington with a difficult constitutional problem: even if
such searches are acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, is this not one
of the technological advancements from which article I, section 7 protects
Washingtonians’ privacy?269 This Comment argues that this is such an
advancement and that genetic information and family connections are
“private affairs” protected by the Washington Constitution. The highly
personal information that can be uncovered through our DNA, coupled

263. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(1)(a) (2020) (mandating collection of biological samples
from “[e]very adult or juvenile individual convicted of a felony, or any of the following crimes”
(emphasis added)).
264. See supra Part IV.
265. Aaron Mak, We May Be Entering a New Era for Using Consumer Genetic Information to
Solve Crime, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/gedmatchwarrant-dna-ancestry-23andme.html [https://perma.cc/X9HX-ZY95] (explaining that GEDmatch had
been used to identify at least fifty-nine suspects as of April 2019).
266. Snohomish Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. Press Release, supra note 19.
267. See supra section II.A; Selk, supra note 6.
268. Kolata & Murphy, supra note 26; Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be
Identified
Through
Genealogy
Databases,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html
[https://perma.cc/TMG3-V3SS].
269. See State v. Hinton, 179 Wash. 2d 862, 877–78, 319 P.3d 9, 17 (2014) (“Article I, section 7
protects Washington citizens from governmental intrusion into affairs that they should be entitled to
hold safe from governmental trespass, regardless of technological advancements.”).

Parman (1) (Do Not Delete)

2020]

12/19/2020 6:01 PM

THE THICKNESS OF BLOOD

2087

with Washington courts’ historically protective treatment of citizens’
privacy interests in DNA, identity, and familial relationships, brings this
interest well within the protective purview of article I, section 7.270 As a
result, when presented with this issue Washington’s courts should take
care to protect these interests.
Ultimately, however, the privacy interests at play here are too precious
and the risks too great to wait for this to work its way through the court
system. Washington’s legislature should thus follow Maryland and the
District of Columbia to secure such privacy to Washington citizens by
passing legislation that forbids familial DNA searching by Washington
law enforcement, in both state and commercial DNA databases.271

270. See supra Part IV.
271. See supra Part V.
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